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I. INTRODUCTION
Not surprisingly, lawyers and economists have different viewpoints
about a large variety of regulatory apparatuses. Economists have tended to
come up with relatively simple and straightforward ways to reform
spectrum policy to combat the inefficiency and tortuous nature of the
spectrum allocation and assignment process. Spectrum Wars should
convince any reader that radical reform of the current system, which is rife
with inefficiency and special interest wrangling, would be a substantial
improvement.
The book goes a level further than most spectrum analyses do-it
tries to integrate the complex relationship between domestic spectrum
policy and international spectrum concerns. Given the author's career in the
international arena this is not surprising, and the numerous tangible
examples of spectrum fights add useful institutional detail to the complex,
confusing, and contentious spectrum processes.
Spectrum Wars can be divided into three major parts: a deep
background of the institutional detail of the frequency management
process, a description of the tensions between different theories on how to
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change spectrum management, and finally, a view about how the changes
in the telecommunications marketplace may affect future spectrum
management proceedings.
II. THE FREQUENCY MANAGEMENT PROCESS
Many parties have argued that the frequency management process is
obsolete, inefficient, and anticompetitive. But the author's description of
several different "wars" for spectrum illuminates the infirmities in the
current system. The examples highlight the need for deft inside-the-beltway
counsel and knowledge of the entire domestic and international spectrum
management process. However, the examples also highlight the fact that
the current system provides little, if any, impetus to using spectrum to
provide the most socially valuable services, while generating long socially
costly delays and large amounts of unnecessary spending. Perhaps the most
important lesson from the book is that, by unpacking the spectrum war
examples, the inefficiency of the current domestic and global spectrum
management systems become clear.
One of the examples in the book is the dispute over the 28 GHz band
(otherwise known as the Ka band) that took place in the mid-1990s.' A
closer examination of the details of that "war" demonstrates why the
solutions do not serve the public interest. In that "war," I was one of the
"judges" at the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or the
"Commission") while Ms. Manner represented one of the parties to the
dispute. A significant amount of spectrum was available, but it was less
than the total sought by the parties involved.
At the top level, there were four general competing interests. The first
group was comprised of Geostationary satellite system ("GSO")
companies. One of these companies, Hughes Spaceway, proposed a
stationary satellite system that would complement its DirecTV DBS service
with additional voice, video and high-speed data services. Hughes and
other GSO companies wanted much of the band allocated for GSO service.'
A second group of interested parties in the battle were the non-
geostationary ("NGSO") satellite systems, predominantly Teledesic. At the
time, Teledesic proposed a system of hundreds of interconnected low earth
1. See JENNIFER A. MANNER, SPECTRUM WARS: THE POLICY AND TECHNOLOGY
DEBATE 21-25 (2003) [hereinafter SPECTRUM WARS].
2. For a description of the different parties' positions, see Rulemaking to Amend Parts
1, 2, 21 and 25 of the Commission's Rules to Redesignate the 27.5-29.5 GHz Frequency
Band, to Reallocate the 29.5-30.0 GHz Frequency Band, to Establish Rules and Policies for
Local Multipoint Distribution Service and for Fixed Satellite Services, First Report and
Order and Fourth Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 1I F.C.C.R. 19005, 3 Comm. Reg. (P &
F) 857 (1996).
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orbiting ("LEO") satellites. The satellite system proposed to provide voice,
video, and high-speed data services. Because of international law, NGSO
systems not only needed spectrum in the band, but they also needed a
change to a footnote in the World Administrative Radio Conference
("WARC") bylaws that gave priority to GSO satellite systems. In addition,
because the satellites traveled around the world, Teledesic wanted the
spectrum allocated globally so that it would not have to shut off its service
in other areas.3 Because GSO satellites cover only a portion of the world,
the international concern, while greater than for terrestrial services, is not
as high as for NGSO services.
The third interested party was Motorola, which was promoting its
NGSO service, Iridium. In contrast to the other interested parties, Motorola
only wanted a modest amount of spectrum in the 28 GHz band, mainly for
control of its satellites, as the major data transmissions would be handled
by spectrum in other frequency bands.
The final interested parties were terrestrial Local Multipoint
Distribution Service ("LMDS") operators and hopefuls, represented mainly
by CellularVision, a company that had been awarded a license to use the 28
GHz spectrum to provide service in New York. At the time, the company
was providing an analog video service as a competitor to cable television,
but it proposed to use service to provide voice, video and high-speed data
services.
Consistent with the lessons in the book, the FCC was barraged with
thousands of pages of technical documents, which essentially boiled down
to studies showing why each particular service needed vast amounts of
spectrum in the band and specific frequencies, and why the other parties in
the band could do with substantially less spectrum. In addition, each party
demonstrated the vast consumer benefits that would come from its voice,
video and high-speed data services.
The decision process was not limited to the FCC. Because of the
international nature of the satellite systems, they also had to fight spectrum
wars at the World Radio Conference ("WRC"). Also, because the satellite
companies were at the WRC, the terrestrial interests could not forgo that
regulatory arena. Had they not participated, the satellite interests would
have presented the FCC with afait accompli.
At the same time, the FCC's decision was further complicated by the
incumbency of CellularVision (serving a very small number of customers
but with very effective advocacy), and by the fact that Motorola obtained
3. Given the high fixed cost of the satellites and command system, the marginal cost
of operating in additional countries would be relatively small.
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permission from the Commission to begin construction of the satellites for
Iridium at its own risk with equipment designed for specific frequencies in
the band. Subsequently, Motorola was able to demonstrate that it would
substantially delay and increase expense for Iridium if the Commission did
not grant the frequency that Motorola had used for its construction.
The war boiled down to a fight among four different points of view,
all with effective counsel, and all with highly detailed business plans
projecting significant consumer benefits and profits for the companies.
However much the companies spent on lawyers and lobbyists to get
spectrum, it was substantially less than the value of the spectrum at issue.
But the satellite interests were vehemently opposed to determining the use
of the spectrum by auction. Instead, they wanted the Commission to
determine that their satellite service was the most valuable use of the
spectrum.
In the end, in accordance with the lessons from the book, the
Commission adopted a compromise plan, giving each party some spectrum,
but not as much as was requested. The process was contentious, wasteful,
and ultimately ended up with a decision that may result in an incredibly
inefficient use of the spectrum. No satellite service has yet been deployed
using the spectrum other than Iridium, and the terrestrial LMDS service,
despite fetching over $500 million at auction, has also not been deployed to
any meaningful extent.
The author's lengthy explanation of this example highlights what I
consider to be the most important lesson contained in the book-the current
spectrum process is incredibly cumbersome and prone to "wars." Spectrum
Wars explains exactly what happened in this case: strategic positioning,
participation in every aspect of the process, and a great deal of time,
patience, and money are all critical pieces of ammunition necessary to
participate successfully in the current spectrum process.
Granted, a move to the economists' vision of a more market-based
system will not eliminate all spectrum wars, but such a move would
eliminate a lot of the waste (unnecessary lawyers, consultants, and other
resources used to persuade the Commission) and more importantly, have a
much better chance at spectrum efficiency than the current politically
influenced and biased decisions, or at best simply arbitrary decisions. It
may take the market a while to unwind the 28 GHz spectrum decisions, but
the FCC should at least put into place a mechanism so that if the spectrum
is more valuable in satellite use than terrestrial use or vice versa, it can be
transitioned to such use without further contentious and lengthy squabbling
at the FCC.
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III. MOVING TO A BETTER PROCESS
The second purpose of this book is to look at the different arguments
for and against a more market-based approach to spectrum management. I
have to confess to being one of the advocates for a more market-based
approach. The author did a good job of listing the arguments used for and
against the use of auctions, and for and against the increase of secondary
markets for spectrum.
The author does a good job of listing the possible arguments on both
sides of the debate. In that regard, the book is a very good introduction to
these issues; lawyers contemplating working in the wireless arena would
benefit from exposure to these arguments. However, while it may not be
the purpose or tenor of this book, a more in-depth examination of the
arguments would provide a better analysis of their validity.
For example, many people have made the argument that auctions
increase the price for wireless services, and higher auction prices make it
impossible to offer wireless services. Viscerally, these statements have
some appeal, and they appear to have substantial influence around the
world. In that respect, it is good that they are brought forward in the
book-to understand how spectrum policy works around the world, it is
important to know what arguments carry the day.
However, it also would have been useful to address some of the
criticisms of these arguments. For example, an FCC staff working paper
by Evan Kwerel and Walt Strack addresses the issue of auctions raising the
cost of wireless services.4 Theoretically, subsequent to paying for a license,
the licensee should ignore the sunk costs (the price paid for the license) and
attempt to maximize profits. This does not only work in theory. Kwerel and
Strack show that there is no difference in the prices charged by licensees
who bought at auction, bought on the secondary market, or got their
licenses from the FCC for the price of lawyers and lobbyists.5 A somewhat
deeper analysis of the arguments, or more reference to other papers that
undertake such analysis, would make this portion of the book more useful.
A second potentially useful extension of the book would include a
discussion of how transitions could be made. The author makes some effort
along these lines by addressing some of the concerns about moving toward
a more liberal use of secondary markets. In that chapter, the book addresses
concerns with enforcement, interference, and public interest obligations, all
of which are clearly implicated in the FCC's recent Order and Further
4. EVAN KWEREL & WALT STRACK, FCC, AUCTIONING SPECTRUM RIGHTS 3-4 (2001),
available at http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/data/papersAndStudies/aucspec.pdf.
5. Id.
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Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on extensions to secondary markets for
spectrum.6
IV. CHANGES IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKETPLACE
The process described in the first two portions of the book is tied
together in the last section on how the telecom meltdown has affected and
is likely to affect the telecommunications marketplace in general and
spectrum wars in particular. While I may not agree with some of the policy
arguments outlined in other parts of the book, the fact is that they have real
currency in many parts of the world, including the United States, and they
have a real impact on the future of the industry.
The book presents some of the more clear reasons for the
telecommunications meltdown-primarily an overoptimistic view of the
increase in demand for telecommunications-based services. But the last
chapter goes further, predicting the impact that the changes occurring in the
financial markets will have on the market for services. In particular, the
book outlines a vision of consolidation in the industry and a number of
low-cost competitors emerging from bankruptcy.
The book then paints a picture of the industry as a phoenix, rising
from the ashes of the meltdown. However, this new incarnation is very
different than the industry that had virtually free capital in the late 1990s.
As a result, the book predicts, the industry will be much more circumspect
in its investment in new technologies and the deployment of new networks.
The author then applies these lessons to the wireless sector in
particular. The difference in the cost structure of some wireless networks as
compared to the cost structure of the traditional wireline networks has some
implications for the success of wireless in the future. Manner implicitly
argues that the new economics of the telecommunications marketplace will
push towards wireless networks that have lower upfront capital costs
because of the scarcity of capital in the industry as a whole.
The book also repeats one of the fallacious arguments about the cost
of auctions-that auctions might adversely impact the development of the
wireless sector because the cost of spectrum under an auction would be too
high. The price of spectrum licenses will be determined by market forces-
in times when wireless services are valuable and spectrum is scarce,
spectrum prices will be high; when wireless services are less in demand, or
when technology increases the capacity of spectrum, the price of spectrum
will fall. To argue that auctions will increase the cost of spectrum so that no
6. Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers to the
Development of Secondary Markets, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 20604 (2003).
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one can afford it reminds one of Yogi Berra talking about a place that no
one goes to because it is too crowded.7 Someone must think that spectrum
is valuable enough to make the high bids that drive up the price of
spectrum.
V. CONCLUSION
Spectrum Wars does a very good job at illustrating what it takes to
acquire spectrum in the current regulatory environment. Companies and
attorneys that have an idea for a spectrum-based service would be advised
to read about the tangled web of a process that is required to gain access to
spectrum. As a result, they may become devotees of the relatively simple,
straightforward and more efficient auction process.
7. See Things People Said: Yogi Berra Quotes, at http://rinkworks.com/said/
yogiberra.shtml (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
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